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Abstract
Ksplice allows system administrators to apply security patches to their operating sys-
tem kernels without having to reboot. Based on a source code patch and the kernel
source code to be patched, Ksplice applies the patch to the corresponding running
kernel, without requiring work from a programmer. To be fully automatic, Ksplice's
design is limited to patches that do not introduce semantic changes to data structures,
but a study of all significant x86-32 Linux security patches from May 2005 to Decem-
ber 2007 finds that only eight patches of 50 make semantic changes. An evaluation
with Debian and kernel.org Linux kernels shows that Ksplice can automatically apply
the remaining 42 patches, which means that 84% of the Linux kernel vulnerabilities
from this interval can be corrected by Ksplice without the need for rebooting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Several contemporary operating systems release kernel security patches many times
per year. Some of these kernel patches repair vulnerabilities which would otherwise
potentially allow an attacker to gain full administrator privileges on the operating
system. Applying these security patches typically requires rebooting the kernel, which
results in downtime and loss of state (e.g., all active network connections). Since
rebooting can cause disruption, system administrators often delay performing security
updates, despite the risk of compromises. This paper describes and evaluates Ksplice,
a system for performing hot updates, which change a running kernel without rebooting
it.
When software developers correct a security problem in the source code of a C
program (which is the language of many kernels), they create and distribute a patch,
which consists of a set of changes to the source code. In the case of a kernel change,
software vendors or system administrators apply the patch to their copy of the source
code, build a new kernel, and then distribute that new binary kernel to servers and
end-user machines, which must be rebooted in order to run the new kernel.
Safely performing a hot update, instead of a traditional update, on an unmodi-
fied C program currently requires significant programmer involvement. Existing hot
update practices, described in Chapter 5, rely on a programmer to write source code
files with certain properties (e.g., [7, 20]) or require manual inspection of the running
binary to achieve safety guarantees and resolve ambiguous symbols (e.g., [1]).
Requiring significant programmer involvement in creating a hot update increases
both the cost and the risk of the update, which discourages the adoption of hot
updates. Ideally, we would like to be able to safely construct hot updates, with no
human involvement, from existing information, such as the patch used to correct the
security vulnerability.
Although performing an arbitrary source code change as a hot update is not
feasible without a programmer writing new code to perform the transition, some
patches can safely be performed as a hot update based solely on the source code
differences. Specifically, we have sufficient information for a hot update when a patch
does not make semantic changes to data structures-that is, changes that would
require existing instances of kernel data structures to be transformed (e.g., a patch
that adds a field to a global data structure would require the existing data structures
to change). Since kernel security patches tend to make as few software modifications
as possible, we can expect many of these patches to make no semantic changes to
data structures.
This paper focuses on developing techniques for safely performing hot updates
without programmer involvement, in the common case that the security patch does
not make semantic changes to data structures. This problem contains several chal-
lenges that have not been solved by previous hot update systems, and effectively
solving these problems helps many hot update systems (not just systems that focus
on patches without semantic changes to data structures). The techniques that we
describe are, compared to previous hot update systems, oriented much more towards
analysis at the object code level, which offers various advantages, as described in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
Ksplice can, without restarting the kernel, apply any source code patch that only
needs to modify the kernel text (including patches to kernel modules and assembly
files). Unlike other hot update systems, Ksplice takes as input only a source code
patch and the original kernel source code, and it updates the running kernel correctly,
with no further human assistance required.
Ksplice does not require any preparation before the system is originally booted.
The running kernel does not need to have been specially compiled, for example.
Other hot update systems require a special kernel design that is conducive to hot
updates [3, 4], require a customized compiler [1, 21], or require a virtual machine
monitor [7].
The performance impact of inserting a Ksplice update into a kernel is minimal. A
small amount of additional kernel memory, proportional to the size of the replacement
functions, will be expended, and function calls to the replaced functions will take a
few cycles longer because of inserted jump instructions. On modern systems, this
overhead should be negligible under most circumstances.
Although generating a Ksplice hot update from a compatible patch requires no
human effort, Ksplice requires a person to perform a single check before invoking
Ksplice: a person is expected to confirm that the target security patch does not make
any semantic changes to data structures. Performing this check requires only seconds
or a few minutes for most security patches. This check is much simpler than the
programmer work required by other hot update systems.
We implemented Ksplice for Linux, but the techniques that Ksplice employs apply
to other operating systems. To evaluate Ksplice's approach, we applied Ksplice to 50
Linux patches for kernel security vulnerabilities from May 2005 to December 2007.
The 50 include all documented x86-32 Linux kernel vulnerabilities from this time
interval with greater consequences than denial of service. We applied the patches
to five different running Debian kernels and six different running kernel.org kernels.
Of the 50 patches, eight make semantic changes and cannot be applied by Ksplice.
The remaining 42 of the 50 patches can be applied using Ksplice without the need
for rebooting, which is a significant advance over the current state in which system
administrators always have to reboot their systems.
The contributions of this paper are a new binary-level approach for constructing
hot updates and an evaluation of this system against Linux security patches. This
Ksplice evaluation is, to our knowledge, the first evaluation of any kernel hot update
system against a comprehensive list of the significant security vulnerabilities within
a commodity operating system over a period of time. We believe that this evaluation
clearly demonstrates that hot updates currently have the potential to eliminate most
kernel security reboots, while requiring little additional work from any programmer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next chapter presents Ksplice's
design for performing hot kernel updates. Chapter 3 describes Linux-specific imple-
mentation considerations. Chapter 4 tests Ksplice against security patches from May
2005 to December 2007. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 relate Ksplice to previous work
and kernel developer community discussions. Chapter 7 summarizes our conclusions
and directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Design
To apply a patch, Ksplice replaces all of the functions that the patch changes. If
any code within a function is patched, then Ksplice will replace the entire function.
Ksplice replaces a function by linking the patched version of the function into the
kernel's address space and by causing all callers of the original function to invoke
the patched version. Ksplice replaces entire functions since they tend to have a
well-defined entry point, at the beginning of the function, which is convenient for
redirecting execution flow away from an obsolete function to a replacement function.
Although replacing entire functions is relatively convenient, this replacement must
be done with care. It involves generating the object code for the patched function,
resolving symbols in the object code of the patched function, stopping the kernel
temporarily, rewriting the initial instructions in the obsolete function to point callers
at the patched function, and starting the kernel again. The rest of the section discusses
how Ksplice performs these operations.
2.1 Overview
Ksplice accepts as input the original kernel source code and a source code patch.
Through a multi-stage process, Ksplice uses this input to create a kernel module that
contains the patched functions (see Figure 2-1). Most of the stages of this process
make few assumptions about the underlying operating system. The design assumes
a reasonable binary format for object code and a basic facility for kernel modules.
In order to make our examples specific, we assume in our discussion that the object
code format is ELF, the Executable and Linkable Format [11], which is widely used
by Linux, BSD, and Solaris.
In order to generate a hot update, Ksplice must determine what code within the
kernel has been changed by the source code patch. Ksplice performs this analysis at
the ELF object code layer, rather than at the C source code layer, for four reasons.
First, operating at the object code layer allows the C compiler to perform the
work of parsing the C language. Other hot update systems parse C by modifying a
mainstream C compiler [1] or by relying upon a research C parser [21], such as the
C Intermediate Language tools [22]. Modifying a mainstream C compiler creates a
dependency upon that version of that compiler and can make a hot update system
more difficult to maintain over time. Using a research C parser creates a dependency
upon a software system that is not widely used and that does not necessarily support
all of the C extensions needed to compile the code in question. Operating at the
object code layer and relying upon the well-established GNU BFD library, which is
used extensively by the popular GNU binary utilities (including the GNU linker Id),
does not have these disadvantages.
Second, looking for object code differences rather than source code differences
naturally provides support for function signature changes, changes to functions with
static local variables, and changes to assembly files, features which are notably missing
from other hot update work [1].
Third, Ksplice's binary comparison techniques avoid a subtle problem with inline
functions. This problem affects other hot update systems that, like Ksplice, are
designed to update programs that were compiled without foresight of the update
system. Compilers will sometimes inline a function in some places and not inline it
in others, which can lead to a hot update system thinking that it replaced the only
copy of a function, while other inline copies still exist and contain the outdated code.
As a result, other hot update systems could leave vulnerable or obsolete code in the
kernel, which could result in a security compromise or data corruption. This problem
additional processing
Figure 2-1: Ksplice's process for creating a hot update
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essentially cannot be avoided without doing some kind of binary code comparison
since any function can potentially be inlined by the compiler. In other words, a hot
update system for legacy binaries cannot avoid this problem by simply declaring inline
functions to be outside of its scope; ignoring this problem is always a safety risk.
Lastly, Ksplice's focus on information available in the object code helps Ksplice
resolve symbols in difficult situations, as discussed in Section 2.6.
In order to understand the effect of a source code patch on the kernel, Ksplice
performs two kernel builds and looks at how the resulting ELF object files differ.
Ksplice builds the original unmodified kernel source in a directory tree that we will
refer to as the pre tree. Next, Ksplice copies this directory tree into a new location
and applies the source code patch. We refer to this patched directory tree as the post
tree. Ksplice then performs a build of the post tree, which recompiles any object files
whose constituent source files have been changed by the source code patch. Ksplice
compares the pre and post object file trees in order to determine which functions were
changed by the patch. It extracts the changed functions from the post tree and puts
them into an object file.
Ksplice then creates a kernel module by combining this object file with generic
code for performing hot updates. A system administrator can then insert the kernel
module into the kernel using the operating system's standard kernel module facility.
After the kernel has loaded and initialized the hot update, the hot update will locate
entry point symbols in the running kernel's memory and insert trampolines at those
locations. These trampolines will direct execution away from the vulnerable code to
new code, located elsewhere, that has been loaded into kernel memory as part of the
hot update.
The kernel module generated by Ksplice is not machine-specific and may be used
on any machine running a kernel compiled from the same original source code. The
patch can easily be reversed by running a user space program that communicates
with the module. Reversing the patch involves removing the trampolines so that the
original function text is once again executed.
2.2 Challenges
The described design must address several challenges in order to be practical:
" Avoiding extraneous differences. The corresponding pre and post object files
will contain many differences that are only tangentially related to the source
code patch. As an example, the GNU C compiler [25] will, by default, lay out
an entire object file's executable text within a single ELF section named .text,
and the C compiler will therefore generate much code within this section that
performs relative jumps to other addresses within this ELF section. If a single
function within an object file is changed in length as a result of the source code
patch, then many relative jump offsets throughout the entire object file will
potentially change as a result of what was originally a simple change to a single
function.
* Determining entry points. Most C functions have one entry point, but assembly-
enhanced parts of the kernel can have several.
* Resolving symbols to kernel addresses. We must use our own mechanism for
performing relocations, rather than the kernel's provided mechanism, because
we need to allow the post code that is being relocated to reference local functions
and data structures. For example, we need to allow the replacement code to
reference the static local variables of existing functions. The kernel symbol table
contains entries for local symbols in addition to global symbols, but the kernel's
provided relocation system only considers global symbols eligible for fulfilling
relocations.
* Handling ambiguous or missing symbols. Attempting to resolve symbols based
on the names in the kernel's symbol table can commonly cause problems when
a symbol name appears more than once or does not appear at all. For example,
the replacement code might reference a function by the name translate_table,
and two or more local symbols with that name might appear in the kernel.
In this situation, the hot update system needs a way of determining which
translate_table address should be used to fulfill this relocation.
* Handling compiler differences. The compiler used to generate the hot update
may not behave the same as the compiler used to compile the original kernel.
The pre code could therefore be different from the code in the running kernel,
which we will refer to as the run version of the machine code. These differ-
ences could cause various serious problems with the hot update process, such as
causing the hot update to neglect to update sections of vulnerable code. Con-
sider the situation in which a patched function (patched_func) is called from a
non-patched function (calling func) that is within the same compilation unit.
Assume that, in the run code, the compiler decided to inline calling func's
call to patched_func. If, in the pre and post code, the compiler chooses to have
calling_func perform a call to patched_func rather than making the call be
inline, then the pre and post code for calling_func will be identical. As a
result, the system would not think that calling_func needs to be replaced in
the running kernel. One would not expect this kind of situation to arise often,
but silently failing to update sections of vulnerable code is unacceptable even
in rare circumstances.
* Finding a safe time to update. After the hot update module has been inserted
into the kernel, the system must find an appropriate time to insert the trampo-
lines and thereby switch over to using the replacement functions. In order for
Ksplice to be able to safely replace a function, that function should not be in
the middle of being executed by any thread on the system. Consider a situation
in which one patched function (calling func) calls another patched function
(called_func). If the patch changes the interface between calling_func and
called_func in any way, then it could be important to ensure that the ob-
solete calling_func only calls the obsolete called_func. Unfortunately, if
calling_func is in the middle of being executed when called_func has its
trampoline inserted, then the obsolete calling_func could call the replace-
ment calledfunc. This incorrect call could cause serious problems.
Patching a previously-patched kernel. After one hot update has been applied to
a running system, safely applying additional hot updates to that system should
remain possible.
The rest of this chapter describes how Ksplice addresses these challenges.
2.3 Handling extraneous differences
In order to identify a more minimal set of changes caused by the source code patch,
Ksplice would like to be able to generate object code that makes no assumptions in
its executable text about where functions are positioned in memory. Avoiding these
function layout assumptions is also useful for generating the replacement code for the
hot update.
To reduce location assumptions, all of Ksplice's kernel builds are performed with
certain compiler options enabled to ensure that every C function and data structure
within the kernel receives its own dedicated ELF section within the resulting ob-
ject files. These options, which are included in the standard GNU C compiler but are
disabled by default, are known as -ffunction-sections and -fdata-sections. En-
abling these options forces the compiler to generate relocations for functions and data
structures, which results in more general code that does not make assumptions about
where functions and data structures are located in memory. Instead, the resulting
object code contains more general assembly instructions along with ELF relocation
entries so that arbitrary addresses can be plugged-in for functions and data structures.
When compiling with these options, kernel functions that have not been directly
changed by the source code patch will often have identical ELF sections in the pre
and post kernel trees. For various reasons, such as nondeterministic compiler opti-
mizations, some of the resulting ELF sections could differ in places not caused by the
source code patch, but such differences are unusual, difficult to avoid, and harmless.
Although Ksplice would like to replace as few functions as possible, we can safely
replace a function with a different binary representation of the same source code,
even if doing so is unnecessary.
2.4 Determining entry points
After determining what ELF sections differ between the pre and post trees, Ksplice
generates a list of all of the entry points to those ELF text sections. Every ELF
symbol pointing into a text section is considered a potential entry point to that
section. C functions typically have one entry point at the start of the function, but
assembly code can result in an ELF section having multiple entry points. Looking for
an arbitrary number of entry points per ELF section allows Ksplice to handle patches
to certain assembly-enhanced parts of the kernel that Ksplice would not otherwise be
able to handle.
2.5 Resolving symbols to kernel addresses
In order to implement its own symbol resolution mechanism, which looks at both local
and global symbols, Ksplice removes the original ELF relocation entries present in
the ELF object files so that the kernel's loader will not recognize the ELF relocations
and try to fulfill them. Instead, Ksplice stores the needed relocation information
in special Ksplice-specific ELF sections that Ksplice uses to perform the relocations
during the module's initialization procedure.
Ksplice must perform these relocations during the module initialization procedure,
rather than in user space, in order to properly support cryptographic verification [19]
of Ksplice kernel updates. Since kernel modules can be linked into and unlinked from
kernel memory after the kernel has booted, the addresses of some kernel functions and
data structures will vary across machines. This variation means that, if we want to
distribute a single cryptographically-signed hot update kernel module that will work
on all machines running a particular kernel version, then we must defer completing
the relocations for that hot update until after the update module has been inserted
into the kernel and the kernel loader has had the opportunity to verify the module's
cryptographic signature.
2.6 run-pre matching solution
Both the ambiguous symbol name problem and the compiler variation problem can
be solved using an approach that we call run-pre matching. The compiler variation
problem arises because of unexpected and undetected differences between the run
code and the pre code. Ksplice can avoid failing silently in this situation by adding a
step to the hot update process to check the run code against the pre code. Specifically,
we should be concerned if we can find a difference between the run code and the pre
code in the kernel compilation units that are being modified by the hot update.
During the process of comparing the run code against the pre code, the hot update
system can also gain information about symbols that Ksplice was previously having
difficulty mapping to addresses because of the ambiguous symbol name problem. The
run code contains all of the information needed to complete the relocations for the
pre code.
run-pre matching passes over every byte of the pre code, making sure that the pre
code corresponds to the run code. When this process comes to a pre word of memory
that is unknown because of a pre relocation entry with an ambiguous symbol name,
Ksplice can compute the correct final pre address based on the corresponding run
bytes in memory.
For example, consider a situation in which the pre code contains a function that
calls translate_table, but two local symbols with that name appear in the kernel.
The pre object code generated by the compiler will, as in all relocation situations,
not contain a final translate_table address at the to-be-relocated position. Instead,
the pre code's metadata will know that a symbol name (translate_table) and an
"addend" * value are associated with that to-be-relocated position in the pre code.
*The "addend" is an offset chosen by the compiler to affect the final to-be-stored value. For x86
32-bit relative jumps, this value tends to be -4 to account for the fact that the x86 jump instructions
expect an offset that is relative to the starting address of the next instruction.
The ELF specification says that the to-be-relocated position's final value in memory
will be computed from the addend (A), the translate_table symbol value (S), and
the final address (P) of the to-be-relocated position. Specifically, this position will
take on the value A + S - P.
When run-pre matching gets to the to-be-relocated location in the pre code, it
will note that this relocation has not yet been fulfilled, and it will examine the run
code in order to gain the information needed to fulfill it. The run code contains the
already-relocated value val, which is val = A + S - Pn. The run-pre matching
system also knows the run address of that position in memory (Prun). The pre
code metadata contains the addend A, and so the symbol value can be computed as
S = val + Pn, - A.
Although Ksplice does not require that the hot update be prepared using exactly
the same compiler and assembler version that were used to prepare the original binary
kernel, doing so is advisable since the run-pre check will, in order to be safe, abort
the upgrade if it detects unexpected binary code differences.
In order to operate correctly, the code for the run-pre matching system needs two
architecture-specific pieces of information. First, the matching system must know the
list of valid jump instructions for the target architecture so that the matching system
does not conclude that the run code and the pre code differ because of two relative
jump instructions that point to the same location but that use differently-sized offsets
for the jump.
Second, the run-pre matching system must know what instruction sequences are
commonly used as no-op sequences by assemblers for that architecture. In order to
manipulate code alignment, assemblers will sometimes insert efficient sequences of
machine instructions that are equivalent to a no-op sequence. The run-pre matching
system needs to be able to recognize these sequences so that they can be skipped
during the run-pre matching process. The GNU assembler for x86-32 and x86-64 has
a preferred no-op-equivalent sequence for each possible desired length between one
byte and 15 bytes.
2.7 Finding a safe time to update
A safe time to update a function is when no thread's instruction pointer falls within
that function's text in memory and when no thread's kernel stack contains a return
address within that function's text in memory.
Before inserting the trampolines, Ksplice captures all of the machine's processors
and checks whether the above safety condition is met for all of the functions being
replaced. If this condition is not satisfied, then Ksplice tries again after a short
delay. If multiple such attempts are unsuccessful, then Ksplice abandons the upgrade
attempt and reports the failure.
Ksplice therefore cannot be used to upgrade non-quiescent kernel functions. A
function is considered non-quiescent if that function is always on the call stack of
some thread within the kernel. For example, the primary Linux scheduler function,
schedule, is generally non-quiescent since sleeping threads block in the scheduler.
This limitation does not prevent Ksplice from handling any of the 50 significant
Linux security vulnerabilities from May 2005 to December 2007.
2.8 Patching a previously-patched kernel
When a system administrator wants to apply a new patch to a previously-patched
running kernel, Ksplice needs to be provided with two inputs, which are similar to
the standard Ksplice inputs:
* the source for the currently-running kernel, including any patches that have
been hot-applied (this source is the "previously-patched source")
* the new source patch (which should be a difference between the previously-
patched source and the desired new source)
The update process is almost exactly the same as before. The pre object code
is generated from the previously-patched source code, and the post object code is
generated from the previously-patched source code with the new patch applied. The
run-pre matching system will compare pre object code against the latest Ksplice
replacement function code already in the kernel. When the hot update is applied, the
previous trampoline is overwritten with a new trampoline.
Chapter 3
Implementation
We implemented Ksplice's design for Linux 2.6 on the x86-32 and x86-64 architectures.
Although small parts of Ksplice, such as the trampoline assembly code, need to
be implemented separately for each supported architecture, most of the system is
architecture-independent.
3.1 Overview
The update "module" produced by Ksplice is actually two Linux kernel modules, so
that part of the system can be unloaded after the update is complete, in order to save
memory. Ksplice's implementation consists of three components:
* a generic "helper" Ksplice Linux kernel module, written in C, responsible for
loading the pre object code and performing run-pre matching
* a generic "primary" Ksplice Linux kernel module, written in C, responsible for
loading the post object code and inserting the trampolines
* user space software, written in C and Perl, that, using the kernel source and
unified diff [9] provided to Ksplice as input, generates processed "helper" and
"primary" object files (these object files are then linked with the generic Ksplice
kernel modules to produce the ready-to-insert modules)
The primary module for a hot update must always be inserted before the helper
module. The primary module will be inactive until the helper module has been
loaded. Once the helper module has been loaded, the update process will begin,
and after the update process is complete, the helper module can be removed. Since
the helper module must contain the entire compilation unit corresponding to each
patched function, it can be significantly larger than the primary module.
The user space responsibilities of performing a Ksplice update are managed by
a Perl script, ksplice-create, that invokes C programs (written using the GNU
Binary File Descriptor library) in order to perform specific operations on object files.
For example, one such C program, objdiff, is responsible for detecting the differ-
ences between corresponding object files and reporting back what sections differ and
the entry points of those sections. Another C program, objmanip, is responsible for
removing the ELF relocations from an object file so that the relocation information
can instead be stored in a Ksplice-specific ELF section, which will be processed after
the module has been inserted. Essentially identical procedures are used for preparing
the pre and post groups of ELF sections. The processed pre ELF sections, which
potentially originate from several different kernel compilation units, are eventually
combined with the helper kernel module. The processed post ELF sections are com-
bined with the primary kernel module in a similar manner.
3.2 Capturing the CPUs to update safely
Ksplice uses Linux's stop machine_run facility in order to help achieve an ap-
propriate opportunity to insert the trampolines. The Linux kernel normally uses
stopmachine_run for CPU hotplugging and suspend/resume functionality. When
invoked, stop_machine_run creates one high priority kernel thread for each CPU on
the machine, and it configures these threads so that each thread will only be scheduled
on its own distinct CPU.
Once these high priority kernel threads have simultaneously captured all of the
CPUs on the system, stop_machine_run will run a desired function on a single
CPU. Ksplice uses stop_machinerun to execute a function that checks for the safety
condition discussed in Chapter 2.7. If this condition is met, the function inserts the
trampolines for the hot update.

Chapter 4
Evaluation
4.1 Linux security patches
We compiled a list of significant Linux 2.6.x kernel security problems from May 2005
to December 2007. We compiled this list of vulnerabilities and the corresponding
patches by matching entries in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
vulnerability list [8] against the Git source control logs of Linus Torvalds' branch
of the Linux kernel source [17]. Only security problems that could result in greater
consequences than denial of service are included on this Linux kernel vulnerability
list; specifically, all of the vulnerabilities on the list involve the potential for some kind
of privilege escalation or unintended information disclosure. We excluded from this
list any architecture-specific vulnerabilities that do not affect the x86-32 architecture.
In this time interval, 50 significant x86-32 Linux kernel vulnerabilities were re-
ported, which are listed in detail in the Appendix and summarized in Table 4.1 and
Figure 4-1. Roughly one-third of the kernel vulnerabilities primarily involved informa-
tion disclosure, and the rest potentially allowed for some kind of privilege escalation.
The frequency of new vulnerabilities with the potential for privilege escalation-
about one vulnerability per month-is consistent with the conventional wisdom that
the Linux kernel must be updated frequently in order to be secure against attack from
users with local accounts on the system. Protecting against this kind of attack can
be important even on systems where all of the people with accounts are trustworthy,
Table 4.1: Number of vulnerabilities by type
Type of Vulnerability Quantity
Privilege escalation 32
Read kernel memory 10
Failure to clear memory 5
Other information disclosure 3
Figure 4-1: Number of patches by patch length
U,C.)
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since a network attacker can commonly access a user account by compromising a
password or ordinary program. In these situations, having an up-to-date kernel can
mean the difference between whether an attacker gains limited access to a system or
full control over it.
Figure 4-1 shows that most Linux kernel security vulnerabilities can be corrected
by modifying relatively few lines of source code. Of the 50 patched vulnerabilities
discussed above, 40 vulnerabilities were corrected in 15 or fewer lines of source code
changes, and 30 vulnerabilities were corrected in 5 or fewer lines of changes.
Reviewing the text of these patches reveals that most Linux kernel vulnerabilities
can be fully corrected without making any semantic changes to the kernel's global,
dynamically-allocated, or static local data structures. We collectively refer to these
data structures as the kernel's "long-lived" data structures. Since these data structures
do not need to change in order to accommodate most patches, many security updates
can be applied to a running system by simply updating the text of the kernel.
Table 4.2: Debian kernels used for implementation testing
Debian version number Release date
2.6.8-2-686-smp_2.6.8-15_i386 2005-03-24
2.6.12-1-686-smp_2.6.12-1_i386 2005-07-22
2.6.16-1-686-smp_2.6.16-1_i386 2006-03-22
2.6.22-1-686_2.6.22-1_i386 2007-07-17
2.6.23-1-686_2.6.23-1li386 2007-12-05
4.2 Methodology
To evaluate Ksplice, we applied Ksplice to the 50 patches described in Section 4.1.
We are interested in how many security patches from this interval can be applied
successfully to running kernels. Success means that the patch was applied and the
kernel kept functioning without any observed problems while building a new kernel
and sending and receiving network traffic. We expect a few of the patches to be in-
compatible with Ksplice because some of the patches require changes to the semantics
of long-lived kernel data structures. For the vulnerabilities for which exploit code was
readily available, we also tested that the exploit code worked before the hot update
and did not work after the hot update.
Since no single Linux kernel version needs all of the 50 security patches (many
of the vulnerabilities were introduced during the 32-month period of ongoing devel-
opment), we tested Ksplice with these 50 patches using five different Linux kernels
released by the Debian GNU/Linux distribution and six different "vanilla" Linux ker-
nels released by kernel.org on behalf of Linus Torvalds. These kernels are shown in
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. The details of which patches were tested on each kernel are
available in the Appendix.
The kernel.org kernels were only introduced into the evaluation process in order
to test security patches that are not applicable to any released Debian kernel. For
most of the patches in this category, the security problems corrected by the patch
were completely absent from any released Debian kernel. Some Linux kernel security
vulnerabilities are caught before they make it into many released kernels seen by users,
Table 4.3: Vanilla kernels used for implementation testing
kernel.org version number Release date
2.6.11.9 2005-05-11
2.6.19 2006-11-29
2.6.20.4 2007-03-23
~2.6.21.1* 2007-04-30
2.6.23-rc3 2007-08-13
2.6.24-rc2 2007-11-06
and other vulnerabilities affect portions of the kernel that are completely disabled by
some Linux distributions.
We obtained the original binary and source Debian kernel packages from a his-
torical archive of nearly all packages released by Debian since mid-2005 [26]. For
each kernel, we began by fetching the compiler and assembler versions originally used
by Debian in order to compile that binary kernel. We then used the Debian kernel
source for that kernel as input to Ksplice, along with an unmodified security patch
taken directly from Linus Torvalds' Git tree. In order to perform the hot update on
a running machine, we installed the corresponding binary Debian kernel package on
a machine, and we booted the machine into that kernel.
4.3 Results
Ksplice has been used to correct 42 of the 50 significant x86-32 kernel vulnerabilities
during the time interval. Ksplice's system for resolving symbol names in difficult
situations and its support for assembly code are important for achieving this per-
centage of supported patches. Nine of the 42 patches modify functions that contain
ambiguous or missing symbols, and much of the kernel makes use of assembly code
via common primitives that manage concurrency control and other operations.
For example, the patch for CVE-2005-1264 changes the function raw_ioctl in
the file drivers/char/raw. c, but both the kernel's raw character device driver and
its ipv4 implementation contain a local function named raw_ioctl. Since both of
*Git revision b7b5f487ab39bc10ed0694af35651a03d9cb97ff
Table 4.4: Kernel vulnerabilities that cannot be patched using the Ksplice design
CVE # Reason for failure
2007-4571 changes data initialization value
2007-1217 changes data initialization value
2006-5753 changes data initialization value
2006-3626 changes data initialization value
2006-1056 changes data initialization value
2005-3179 changes data initialization value
2005-2709 adds field to structure
2005-2500 adds field to structure
these drivers can be included with the kernel as an optional module, a naive hot
update system would find, when running on a kernel with only the ipv4 driver loaded,
the single raw_ioctl symbol and replace it with the raw character device driver
replacement function. Ksplice's run-pre matching system ensures that symbols are
resolved correctly and that functions look as expected before they are patched.
As another example, the patch for CVE-2007-4573 modifies the x86-64 assembly
file ia32entry.S in order to zero-extend all registers in order to avoid an arbitrary
execution vulnerability in the 32-bit kernel entry path. Ksplice handles this patch
using the same techniques that handle patches to pure C functions.
Eight of the 50 patches were not supported by the Ksplice design. As shown in
Table 4.4, these patches change the semantics of long-lived kernel data structures,
either by changing the default value of a data structure or by adding a field to a data
structure. Some of the patches explicitly change the initial value of a data structure
via the C variable declaration, and some patches change a data structure initialization
function.
Working exploits for two recent x86 vulnerabilities are available on the web. We
have used exploit code for CVE-2006-2451 [15] and CVE-2007-4573 [10] in order
to confirm that these security vulnerabilities disappear when the corresponding hot
updates are applied.

Chapter 5
Related Work
There are two streams of work related to Ksplice: academic papers with various
approaches to the hot update problem and black hat publications describing how
to perform malicious hot updates on commodity operating systems. We discuss the
relationship of Ksplice to these in turn.
5.1 Research literature overview
The existing research hot update systems that are designed to update "legacy bina-
ries" (mostly-unmodified binaries that are created with essentially no foresight of the
update system) perform their patch analysis and update construction at the source
code layer, rather than at the object code layer, which results in several disadvantages
for these systems.
First, because of the complexity of analyzing a patch and constructing the replace-
ment code at the source code level, DynAMOS [20] and LUCOS [7] leave essentially
all of this work to a human kernel programmer. In these systems, a kernel pro-
grammer needs to construct replacement source code files with certain properties,
which requires "tedious engineering effort" [71 and, as with any human involvement,
is error-prone.
The one system which does implement in software the construction of replacement
code, OPUS [1], suffers from several limitations related to its source-level approach
to this problem. Unlike OPUS, Ksplice's binary-level approach supports function
signature changes, changes to functions with static local variables, and changes to
assembly files. All of these features are natural consequences of approaching hot
updates from the object code level rather than the source code level.
Intuitively, looking for object code differences works well because it comes closer
than the source code changes to what we actually care about-how and where the
machine's execution might be changed. Determining how to handle arbitrary source
code changes can require much information about the semantics of the C and assembly
languages. For example, because of implicit casting, simply changing a data type in
a function prototype in a C header file (e.g., from an int to a long long) can result
in changes to many different functions (which have not themselves had their source
code changed at all, even after C preprocessing). The Ksplice approach to hot updates
described in Chapter 2 does not require special cases in order to deal with language-
level nuances such as macros, function signatures, static local variables, and whether
code is written in C or raw assembly.
Second, and more importantly, essentially any hot update system which operates
at the source code layer exclusively is vulnerable to an inescapable inline function
problem described in detail in Section 2.1. Fundamentally, the binary version of
the running program contains information that is not available in its source code,
and looking at the binary code is necessary in order to guarantee the safety of the
update. Any hot update system for legacy binaries needs to use a mechanism similar
to Ksplice's run-pre matching system to be safe, in order to detect where code has
been inlined by the compiler.
Third, Ksplice's binary-level run-pre matching system helps Ksplice resolve am-
biguous symbol names, which other hot update systems either cannot handle or can
only tolerate with significant human intervention. Ksplice's enhanced ability to re-
solve symbol names was needed for 9 of the 42 successful patches from the evaluation.
It is also worth noting that the Ksplice evaluation is structured differently from
the evaluations of previous legacy binary hot update systems. Ksplice's evaluation
measures Ksplice against all 50 of the significant Linux x86-32 security vulnerabilities
over a 32-month time interval. Previous evaluations of hot update systems for legacy
binaries have not tested those systems against a comprehensive list of the patches
over a time interval. The DynAMOS and LUCOS evaluations each describe testing
5 patches; the OPUS evaluation describes testing 26 patches from a corpus of 883
vulnerabilities.
5.2 Research literature individual systems
Since DynAMOS, LUCOS, and OPUS construct updates for legacy binaries at the
source code layer, these systems are affected by the limitations described in Sec-
tion 5.1.
DynAMOS is a recent hot update system that helps a programmer to manually
prepare hot updates for Linux. Since DynAMOS requires a kernel programmer to
write new code, its design can accomodate certain kinds of semantic changes to data
structures, as long as a kernel programmer writes the appropriate code and debugs
it. Ksplice's design could incorporate this functionality, but we do not do so because
of the risks inherent in programmers writing code for each hot update. Ksplice im-
plements and evaluates updates without any human component in order to judge the
potential of hot updates at their safest.
LUCOS is a virtualization-based hot update system that enables a programmer
to manually prepare hot updates for a Linux machine running on top of a customized
version of the Xen [2] virtual machine monitor. LUCOS uses the virtual machine
monitor in order to gain a high degree of control over the kernel during the update
process. By controlling the kernel's underlying hardware, LUCOS can, for example,
intervene when particular addresses in memory are accessed. Unlike LUCOS, Ksplice
does not require virtualization.
OPUS is a user space hot update utility for C programs that shares several design
choices with Ksplice. OPUS, like Ksplice, targets security updates and does not
require source code design changes to the to-be-updated software. OPUS requires the
least programmer work of any of the previous hot update systems, but OPUS requires
a programmer to intervene for many patches that are naturally handled by Ksplice's
binary-level approach, as described in Chapter 5.1. For example, OPUS would not
be able to resolve the ambiguous symbol names in 9 of the 42 kernel security patches
successfully performed by Ksplice. Also, a programmer using OPUS needs to perform
a tedious check for inline functions in the to-be-updated binary in order to ensure
patch safety (looking for the inline keyword in the source code is not sufficient since
modern compilers routinely inline functions that lack the keyword).
The K42 research operating system [3, 4] has implemented hot update capabilities
in K42 by leveraging particular abstractions provided by that operating system's
modular, object-oriented kernel. Ksplice's design focuses on immediately supporting
existing, mainstream operating systems, with no strict expectations placed upon the
original, running kernel. For example, a Ksplice user with an existing Linux system
should not need to reboot into a redesigned, "hot update compatible" Linux kernel
before they can start using hot updates.
Ginseng [21] is a user space hot update utility for C programs that handles more
kinds of updates than either OPUS or Ksplice. Ginseng is capable of upgrading user
space software such as OpenSSH across several years' worth of releases, but Ginseng
makes significant compile-time changes to programs. Ginseng rewrites C programs
at compile time in order to perform function indirection and type wrapping, and
Ginseng expects a programmer to annotate the to-be-updated software to indicate
safe update points. In contrast, OPUS and Ksplice do not rewrite the to-be-updated
software at compile time and do not require any programmer annotations.
The DAS operating system [12] included hot update primitives in the operating
system, but these primitives could not be used to upgrade the kernel.
Gupta et al. built an early system [13] for performing hot updates on C user space
programs that is a predecessor to OPUS. Unlike OPUS, the system requires programs
to be linked against a special library, and, during an upgrade, it loses program state
stored in the kernel because of how it creates a new process instead of performing the
upgrade in place.
In other work, Gupta et al. proved that verifying whether or not a programmer has
provided a correct transition function for accomplishing a source code upgrade is, in
the general case, undecidable [14]. In other words, hot update system software cannot,
in the general case, prove that a source code patch, along with a state transformation
function, results in a valid state for the new program.
Many other systems have previously been designed for modifying a running pro-
gram's behavior, but most such systems cannot perform updates to legacy C binaries,
such as an unmodified kernel compiled from C.
5.3 Black hat techniques
The black hat community has been performing hot updates on commodity operating
system kernels for many years as part of rootkits. Computer attackers benefit from
modifying the kernel so that they can hide their activities and exert a high level of
control over the system.
Publications on rootkits for the Linux, BSD, and Microsoft Windows operating
systems [5, 16, 18, 24] describe techniques that aid in the construction of hot updates
for these platforms. Black hats, however, have notably different hot update goals
than system administrators; a black hat only needs one manually-constructed hot
update in order to succeed, and, in general, a black hat is more willing than a system
administrator to tolerate a slight chance that a hot update will destabilize the target
machine.
Instead of pursuing a generalized approach for safely accomplishing arbitrary
source code hot updates, these documents tend to focus on simple approaches which
usually work for accomplishing particular goals. For example, these publications sug-
gest using memory patterns (called "keys"), which are a few bytes long, in order to find
particular parts of the kernel, such as particular data structures, in memory. These
multibyte keys can have several problems, such as appearing several times in memory
or not appearing at all on a different machine. Various strategies exist for obtaining
a "reasonable guess at how useful a key is and if a key is not at all stable" [5] (for
example, a person can try a key on multiple machines and insert a wildcard into the
key if necessary), but these strategies are laborious and still do not provide strong
expectations about whether the update will work. Ksplice's approach for generating
expectations for the contents of kernel memory and systematically mapping symbol
names to values is significantly more general than the techniques described in these
rootkit publications.
Although Ksplice is safer and easier to use than existing hot update practices,
Ksplice does not provide malware authors with any troubling capabilities that they do
not already possess. Black hats have known for many years how to create rootkits that
accomplish their goals using ad hoc kernel inspection and modification techniques.
For this reason, once an attacker has unrestricted access to kernel memory, a computer
system must already be assumed to be completely compromised. The best way to
protect against attackers is to promptly patch security vulnerabilities so that attackers
never gain unrestricted access to kernel memory. The goal of Ksplice is to make this
kernel patching process easier.
Chapter 6
Discussion
Within kernel developer communities, several arguments have been presented about
why eliminating upgrade reboots is more trouble than it is worth. A summary of
some of these arguments and Ksplice's perspective follows.
Isn't a general solution too hard to adopt? Some people have approached hot
software upgrades by looking at the problem of how to migrate a running system
from one arbitrary kernel version to the next-released version. Since adjacent ker-
nel versions sometimes contain major code changes, automatically handling adjacent
version transitions can present significant challenges. Systems for handling arbitrary
upgrades inevitably increase the workload associated with releasing a new kernel ver-
sion; for example, a developer might need to write and debug a state-transformer in
order to bring data from an old format into a new format.
As discussed in Section 4.1, most Linux kernel security patches are quite limited
in scope and do not change the semantics of any long-lived data structures. We can
therefore leave the kernel's internal data entirely alone for most security hot updates,
which allows for an easy-to-adopt solution.
Aren't dynamic kernel modules enough? Some people have argued that a
kernel module system, which allows the superuser to dynamically add and remove
subsystems from the kernel, eliminates the need for other mechanisms for updating
the kernel. For example, a security vulnerability in a particular network driver could
be corrected by unloading the old version of that module and then loading a new
version.
Unfortunately, much kernel code cannot be treated as a freely-unloadable module
either because it contains core functions that cannot be unloaded at all or because
it contains important state that the user would not want to lose by unloading the
module. For example, unloading a networking driver could cause the system to lose
important networking state, which would potentially create as much inconvenience
as a reboot.
Isn't rebooting just fine? Some people argue that rebooting simply is not a seri-
ous concern, because software-in particular, server software-should already handle
machine reboots on an application level gracefully. Although some systems are indeed
designed in order to minimize the negative impact of a machine reboot, many appli-
cations handle reboots poorly because they do not support saving and resuming their
exact previous state. Handling these problems in every application is time-consuming
for developers, and some applications will likely never handle restarts as well as one
would like. Furthermore, even under the best circumstances (with ideal software), the
interruption associated with reboots can be undesirable. Ksplice provides a low-cost,
easy-to-adopt alternative.
Isn't redundancy, not a hot update system, the right way to achieve high
availability? In some situations where high availability is desirable, redundancy
might be difficult to achieve for cost or other reasons. More importantly, hot update
systems can provide significant benefit even in applications where high availability
is not important. Many desktop machines are not rebooted in order to apply kernel
security updates because of the burden imposed by rebooting. High availability is
not important on these machines, but they can still benefit significantly from hot
updates (since hot updates allow them to be patched when they would not be patched
otherwise).
Doesn't kexec already provide the ability to update the kernel? kexec [23]
is a Linux feature which was designed to help users who have a buggy or slow BIOS
to reboot their computers faster; it is not a hot update system. When kexec boots a
machine into a new kernel, the entire state of the running machine is lost, including
all kernel state and all programs in user space.
Doesn't any software that modifes a running program infringe on U.S.
patent 10/307,902? No, that document is a patent application, not a patent,
and that application received a "final rejection" in April 2006 because of prior art.
Programmers have been making modifications to running programs since some of the
earliest computer systems.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Ksplice's binary-level approach to hot updates has been demonstrated to be able to
construct updates, without programmer involvement, for 84% of the 50 significant
Linux kernel security patches from May 2005 to December 2007. The remaining
patches make semantic changes to data structures and therefore would require pro-
grammer involvement in order to perform as hot updates.
A system administrator could, at the present time, use an implementation of
Ksplice to eliminate most reboots associated with security upgrades, which is a no-
table advance over the current state.
Due to Ksplice's focus on enabling safe hot updates that require minimal program-
mer involvement, it should be possible for any Linux distributor-or other motivated
individual-to start releasing Ksplice-based hot update packages for common starting
kernel configurations. People who subscribe their systems to these updates would be
able to transparently receive kernel hot updates along with the user space software
updates to their system. This kind of distribution of hot updates would, without
any ongoing effort from users, significantly reduce how frequently they are notified by
their computer that they need to reboot for pending security updates to take effect.
Distribution of hot kernel security updates can reduce downtime, decrease windows
of security vulnerability, and improve the user experience.
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Appendix
The table below shows 50 security vulnerabilities from May 2005 to December 2007
along with the type of each vulnerability and the sum of the number of non-empty
lines of non-comment code added and/or removed by the associated patch. The patch
dates do not proceed in chronological order because CVE numbers are not necessarily
assigned in the same order in which vulnerabilities are corrected in Linus' kernel tree.
The next two columns indicate the date that Linus' kernel tree was modified to include
the patch and the identification number that Git automatically assigned to the patch.
This commit ID number provides a reliable mechanism for retrieving the patch and
its associated developer commentary. The final column indicates the Linux kernel
version on which the patch was successfully applied using Ksplice. "N/A" appears
in the final column when that vulnerability's patch changes data structure semantics
and therefore cannot be used with Ksplice.
We performed the vulnerability type classifications by reading the CVE vulner-
ability descriptions and the Linux source code patches. "Read kmem" refers to the
potential for a local user to read the contents of sensitive kernel memory. "Clear
mem" refers to the potential for a local user to receive a buffer that contains traces of
sensitive information that should have previously been cleared from the buffer by the
kernel. "Disclosure" refers to other vulnerabilities which directly enable a local user
to gain access to sensitive information; further exploitation of the system once this
information has been obtained might, or might not, be possible. "Escalation" refers to
vulnerabilities which potentially allow a user to perform privileged operations, such as
the ability to execute arbitrary code as the kernel or the ability to write to privileged
I/O ports.
Linux x86-32 kernel vulnerabilities from May 2005 to December 2007
Type Lines + Patch DateCVE # Test kernel
Type2005-1263
2005-1264
2005-1589
2005-2456
2005-2492
2005-2500
2005-2709
2005-3179
2005-3180
2005-3276
2005-3784
2005-4605
2005-4639
2006-0039
2006-0095
2006-0457
2006-1056
2006-1343
2006-1524
2006-1857
2006-1858
2006-1863
2006-1864
2006-2071
2006-2451
2006-2935
2006-3626
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Read kmem
Escalation
Escalation
Disclosure
Clear mem
Clear mem
Escalation
Read kmem
Escalation
Read kmem
Clear mem
Read kmem
Disclosure
Clear mem
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
4
3
4
3
4
3
115
2
10
1
2
38
2
4
4
15
42
2
3
4
6
9
3
2
2
2
1
2005-05-11
2005-05-13
2005-05-14
2005-07-26
2005-09-19
2005-08-10
2005-11-04
2005-10-03
2005-10-04
2005-07-27
2005-11-10
2005-12-30
2005-11-08
2006-05-19
2006-01-06
2006-02-03
2006-04-20
2006-05-28
2006-04-17
2006-05-19
2006-05-19
2006-04-21
2006-05-15
2006-04-12
2006-07-12
2006-07-10
2006-07-14
Linus Git Commit # (Patch+Log)
a84a505956f5c795a9ab3d60d97b6b91a27aa571
68f66feb300423bb9ee5daecb1951af394425a38
118326e940bdecef6c459d42ccf05256ba86daa7
a4flbac62564049ea4718c4624bOfadc9f597c84
6dlcfe3f1752f17e297df60c8bcc6cd6eOa58449
58fcb8dfObf663bb6b8f46cd3010bfe8dl3d97cf
330d57fb98a916fa8e1363846540dd420e99499a
c0758146adbe39514e75ac860ce7e49f865c2297
9bc39bec87ee3e35897fe27441e979e7c208f624
71ae18ec690953e9ba7107c7cc44589c2ccOd9f1
7ed0175a462c4c30f6df6faclcccacO58f997739
8b90dbOdf7187a01fb7177flf812123138f562cf
5cl5cOb4fa850543b8ccfcf93686d24456cc384d
2c8ac66bb2ff89e759f0d632a27cc64205e9ddd9
9d3520a339d62f942085e9888f66905eb8b350bd
6d94074f0804143eac6bce72dcO4447c0040e7d8
18bd057b1408cd110ed23281533430cfc2d52091
6c813c3fe9e30fcf3c4d94d2ba24108babd745bO
69cf0fac6052c5bd3fb3469a41d4216e926028f8
a601266e4f3c479790f373c2e3122a766d123652
dd2dlc6f2958d027e4591ca5d2aO4dfe36ca6512
296034f7de8bdf111984ce1630ac598a9c94a253
3b7c8108273bed41a2fcO4533cc9f2026ff38c8e
b78b6af66a5fbafl7d7e6bfc32384df5e34408c8
abf75a5033d4da7b8a7e92321d74021dlfcfb502
454d6fbc48374be8f53b9bafaa86530cf8eb3bc1
18bObbd8ca6d3cb9O425aaOd77b99a762c6d6de3
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.11.9
2.6.8
2.6.12
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.6.12
2.6.12
2.6.12
2.6.12
2.6.12
2.6.16
2.6.12
2.6.12
N/A
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
N/A
-~-- --- ~---- ~----- --- ~----
Linux x86-32 kernel vulnerabilities from May 2005 to December 2007 (continued)
Linus Git Commit # (Patch+Log)CVE #
2006-3745
2006-4813
2006-5751
2006-5753
2006-6106
2006-6304
2007-0005
2007-0958
2007-1000
2007-1217
2007-1353
2007-1730
2007-1734
2007-2480
2007-2875
2007-3105
2007-3848
2007-3851
2007-4308
2007-4571
2007-5904
2007-6063
2007-6206
Type
Escalation
Clear mem
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Read kmem
Escalation
Read kmem
Read kmem
Read kmem
Escalation
Read kmem
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Escalation
Read kmem
Escalation
Escalation
Disclosure
* Git revision b7b5f487ab39bc10ed0694af35651a03d9cb97ff
Lines ±
69
2
7
285
30
3
3
4
2
364
11
1
4
38
15
9
13
15
4
65
199
5
Patch Date
2006-08-22
2006-10-11
2006-11-20
2007-01-05
2007-01-08
2006-12-06
2007-03-06
2007-01-26
2007-03-09
2007-02-28
2007-05-05
2007-03-16
2007-03-28
2007-04-30
2007-05-09
2007-07-19
2007-08-17
2007-08-07
2007-11-07
2007-09-17
2007-11-13
2007-12-01
2007-11-28 c46f739dd39db3bO7ab5deb4e3ec8lelcO4a9laf
Test kernel
2.6.23
c164a9baOa8870c5c9d353f63085319931d69f23
8c58165108e26d18849a0138c719e680f281197a
ba8379b220509e9448c00Oa77cf6c15ac2a559cc7
be6aabOe9fa6d3c6d75aale38ac972d8b4ee82b8
f4777569204cb59f2f04fbe9ef4e9a6918209104
6d4df677f8a60ea6bcOefla596cla3a79bid4882
059819a41d4331316dd8ddcf977a24ab338f4300
lfb844961818ce94e782acf6a96b92dc2303553b
d2b02ed9487ed25832d19534575052e43f8eOc4f
17fOcd2f350b90b28301e27fe0Oe39f34bfe7e730
0878b6667f28772aa7d6b735abff53efc7bf6d91
d35690bedal429544d46c8eb34b2e3a8c37ab299
39ebcO276bada8bb70eO67cb6dOeb71839cOfb08
de34ed91c4ffa4727964a832c46e624ddl495cf5
85badbdf5120d246ce2bb3fla7689a805f9c9006
5a021e9ffd56c22700133ebc37d607f95be8f7bd
d2d56c5f51028cb9f3d800882eb6f4cbd3f9099f
21f16289270447673a7263cccOb22d562fb01ecb
5f78e89b5f7041895c4820be5c000792243b634f
ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212
133672efbc1085f9af990bdc145e1822ea93bcf3
eafelaa37e6ec2d56f14732b5240c4dd09fO613a
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.16
N/A
2.6.16
2.6.19
2.6.16
2.6.19
2.6.16
N/A
2.6.16
2.6.16
2.6.20.4
-2.6.21.1*
2.6.20.4
2.6.22
2.6.23-rc3
2.6.22
2.6.23
N/A
2.6.24-rc2
2.6.23
